
Publication details
Year: 2008
Pages: 13-20
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Inference to the best explanation and mathematical realism", Synthese 160 (1), 2008, pp. 13-20.
Abstract
Arguing for mathematical realism on the basis of Field’s explanationist version of the Quine–Putnam Indispensability argument, Alan Baker has recently claimed to have found an instance of a genuine mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon. While I agree that Baker presents a very interesting example in which mathematics plays an essential explanatory role, I show that this example, and the argument built upon it, begs the question against the mathematical nominalist.
Cited authors
Publication details
Year: 2008
Pages: 13-20
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Inference to the best explanation and mathematical realism", Synthese 160 (1), 2008, pp. 13-20.