On synchronic dogmatism

Rodrigo Borges

pp. 3677-3693

in: Benjamin C. Jantzen, Deborah G. Mayo, Lydia Patton (eds), Ontology & methodology, Synthese 192 (11), 2015.

Abstract

Saul Kripke (Philosophical troubles, 2011) argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism (i.e., the view that, if one knows that p, then one may rationally decide now to disregard any future evidence against p one may encounter). According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.

Cited authors

Kripke Saul